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ABSTRACT 
 
The cost of tendering in the construction industry is widely suspected to be excessive, but there is 
little robust empirical evidence to demonstrate this. It also seems that innovative working practices 
may reduce the costs of undertaking construction projects and the consequent improvement in 
relationships should increase overall value for money.  The aim of this proposed research project is to 
develop mechanisms for measuring the true costs of tendering based upon extensive in-house data 
collection undertaken in a range of different construction firms.  The output from this research will 
enable all participants in the construction process to make better decisions about how to select 
members of the team and identify the price and scope of their obligations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The costs associated with tendering are seen by the construction industry to be significant, typically 
quoted as ½ – 1% of turnover, and 2 – 3% of bid price for PFI (now PPP) bids.  However, there is no 
robust empirical evidence to support this view. Those contractors whose bid includes a design 
element have to undertake more work than traditional general contractors. How much more is not 
widely understood. 
The costs associated with tendering may be a specific example of general transaction costs, an are 
which has been the subject of empirical work in various industries.  For example, Masden et al. 
(1991), whose empirical study relied on selecting a limited number variables and asking respondents 
to give an ordinal score for the importance of each factor, related to 74 observations from one firm 
involved with a shipbuilding contract.  These qualitative evaluations were then analysed using 
econometric methods to test various hypotheses about the integration decision.  The limitations of this 
work are connected with the use of proxies for data instead of real cost data, and with studying only a 
small sample of decisions from one firm.  The idiosyncrasies of the chosen industry are important, 
such as the complexity of the process and scheduling issues as well as the application of government 
regulations to defence contracts.  There are too many approximations in their data for their 
conclusions to be reliable, even within the limited parameters of their study.  They identify the 
difficulty of obtaining data as the key obstacle to testing transaction-cost theory.  However, they assert 
that the costs of organizing work in the sample that they studied formed about 14% of the overall cost 
of the activity.  It is this cost that is at the root of the decision about whether to make or buy, in terms 
of transaction cost analysis.   
In dealing with this potential analysis of ascertaining the costs of getting work and enforcing 
contracts, it seems that multiple layers of sub-contracting add enormously to the overall construction 
budget.  Proponents of new ways of working (see below) point to the apparently unnecessary 
duplication of costs in multiple layers of sub-contracting.  This is sometimes seen a good reason for 
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reducing the general level of sub-contracting in the industry.  This argument is similar to the use of 
transaction cost theory as an explanation for the existence and extent of sub-contracting, an 
increasingly popular view in construction  research (for example, Winch, 1989). There is no doubt 
that the costs of tendering, or of obtaining work by some other means, are transaction costs.   But 
attempts to use transaction cost analysis to understand the decisions of main contractors as to whether 
to sub-contract work or whether to use their own labour supply have not been very fruitful in the past. 
The theoretical approach using the concept of the internal labour market as opposed to the external 
labour market suggests that there should be a movement towards the internal labour market and away 
from sub-contracting (Buckley and Enderwick 1989). In fact, in the UK the trend has been in the 
opposite direction ever since the end of the Second World War. 
Hillebrandt and Cannon (1990) list five characteristics of construction which affect the division of 
work between that carried out by the contractor directly and that which is sub-contracted:  
 the finite construction period of each project; 
 the wide geographical spread of location of projects and especially that of large ones which 
can be undertaken only by major firms; 
 the uneven requirement for specific skills over the life of the project; 
 the wide diversity of skills required such that any one contractor may not be able to supply all 
of them; 
 fluctuations in the demand for any particular type of work. 
These factors far outweigh the theoretical reasons which favour the internal labour market and result 
in the widespread sub-contracting of the UK industry.  Buckley and Enderwick accept that these 
factors, as well as others related to the control of the workforce, explain the situation on the ground.  
There may well be similar problems in applying transaction cost economics to the tendering situation.  
The mere fact that sub-contracting seems more expensive than direct labour is not sufficient reason to 
call for a reduction of sub-contracting.  The important decision in the construction industry is not 
whether to outsource or not, but how best to structure the relationships in the complex network of 
contracts that typify construction projects.   
Tendering costs are normally absorbed as overheads (Dawood 1995) and each bid must incorporate 
the cost of failed tenders (Hillebrandt 2000). The extent of these costs is not easy to ascertain, but 
there have been some attempts. For example, the pre-contract costs associated with health and safety 
legislation in the UK were reported by The Consultancy Co. Ltd (1997) who found that in 1996, one 
large contractor received 5,360 pre-qualification questionnaires which cost £589,600 to complete. The 
same contractor received 1,802 sets of tender documentation for which it cost £495,550 to prepare an 
OHS response. The total of these costs during the year was £1.085m, but only 10% of the tender 
responses were successful.  
At a workshop involving the industrial partners for this research proposal in July 2000, it was reported 
that building services contractors had calculated that up to 15% of their turnover could be accounted 
for by “unnecessary” tendering processes, intriguingly close to the 14% associated with “organizing 
work” reported by Masden et al. (1991).  Many other researchers have pointed out the wasteful 
expense of competitive bidding (Pearson 1985, Dawood 1994, Pasquire and Collins 1997), but little 
has been done to test the assumption that contractor selection methods influence costs of the tendering 
process. There are many mechanisms for selecting contractors (Lingard et al. 1998). Each demands 
different types of documentation and the costs vary. Clients need to be able to make an informed 
judgement on the best value and not the cheapest price in their selection decisions (Egan 1998). 
Current practice makes such informed decisions very difficult to achieve. 
Innovative approaches to business processes reduce the reliance on competitive tendering and focus 
instead on building co-operative and collaborative business relationships over the medium to long-
term.  It is possible that such innovative practices reduce the costs of tendering as well as the 
incidence of claims and disputes.  The difference between the final project cost and the tender sum 
may also be lower when prices are not driven down at the outset.  The aim of this research is to test 
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these ideas and provide robust empirical data upon which conclusions can be drawn about the tangible 
business benefits of innovative procurement practice.  
CALLS FOR CHANGE 
Tendering was among the main issues tackled by the Latham Report, a joint government-industry 
review of procurement and contractual arrangements, published in the UK in 1994.  It would probably 
be no exaggeration to say that Latham sees traditional tendering as “the root of adversarial attitudes” 
(for example, Latham, 1994: 58).  In his earlier, interim report, he levelled a number of serious 
criticisms at the industry’s traditional tendering process.  These included the sheer expense of 
complying with tender procedures (particularly for design and build work), the excessive length of 
tender lists, and the existence, particular at the level of subcontract tendering, of “malpractices” such 
as “Dutch auctioning” and “bid peddling”1 (Latham, 1993: 28). The prevalence of  Dutch auctioning 
and bid peddling are perfect examples of the failure of traditional tendering: carried out with the aim 
of price-reduction, the effect of both is to undermine the willingness of a prospective contractor to 
commit to best price in the initial tender (Construction Industry Board, 1997a: 21). Latham’s 
recommendations on tendering show a particular concern that public sector clients, while being aware 
of European Union Directives, should tender selectively and adhere to established codes of procedure. 
Clients who “seek tenders on a design and build basis” should be particularly aware of the costs of 
bidding for this type of work, and modify their selection procedures accordingly (Latham, 1994: 57). 
Latham also noted that local authorities were being “severely hampered by being forced to accept the 
lowest tender” often neglecting other aspects of “value for money” (Latham, 1994: 58). Four of 
Latham’s 30 specific recommendations in the executive summary (Latham, 1994: vii-ix) refer to 
tendering: 
 The Construction Industry Council should publish a code of practice dealing with “project 
management and tendering issues”. 
 “Tender list arrangements should be rationalized … and advice issued on partnering”. 
 “Tenders should be evaluated … on quality as well as price” and recommendations on tender 
periods should be followed. 
 “A code of practice for the selection of sub-contractors should be drawn up” … with “short 
tender lists” and “fair tendering procedures”. 
In 1995 the Construction Industry Board (CIB) was set up with the primary objective of implementing 
the Latham recommendations.  Among the CIB’s publications, several relate to tendering, and these 
include codes of practice for the selection of consultants, main contractors and sub-contractors, as 
well as related publications on partnering, briefing and pre-qualification.  The common features of the 
codes for tendering are the requirements that: 
 Clear and transparent procedures should be followed. 
 Tender lists should be compiled systematically and be as short as possible. 
 Conditions should be the same for all tenderers. 
 Confidentiality should be respected. 
 Sufficient time is to be allowed for tendering. 
 Sufficient information should be provided. 
 Tenders should be assessed on quality as well as price. 
 Tender prices should not change on an unaltered scope of works (Construction Industry 
Board, 1997b and 1997c). 
In July 1998 a rather more radical approach to tendering was exhibited in another UK construction 
industry report. Entitled ‘Rethinking Construction’ it was commissioned by the Department of the 
                                                     
1 Dutch auctioning describes the practice whereby bidders are invited to engage in further cost-cutting rounds 
after the initial tenders have been received; the practice of bid peddling is generally restricted to sub-contract 
procurement and involves the successful main contractor receiving unsolicited sub-contract bids directly after 
securing a project. 
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Environment, Transport and the Regions and produced by a ‘task force’ under the chairmanship of Sir 
John Egan. The report reflected a ‘deep concern that the industry as a whole is under-achieving’ and 
that ‘too many of the industry’s clients are dissatisfied with its overall performance’ (Construction 
Task Force, 1998: paragraphs 4-6). In order to achieve the ambitious performance targets set in the 
report, Egan observed that the industry will need to make ‘radical changes to the processes through 
which it delivers its projects’ with a view to ‘ eliminating waste and increasing value’ (Construction 
Task Force, 1998: chapter 3). The report makes specific reference to the need to ‘replace competitive 
tendering with long term relationships based on clear measurement of performance and sustained 
improvements in quality and efficiency’ (Construction Task Force, 1998: paragraphs 67-71). This 
involves ‘new criteria for the selection of partners’ based, not on ‘lowest price, but ultimately … best 
overall value for money’ (Construction Task Force, 1998: chapter 4). According to Egan, ‘the most 
immediately accessible savings from alliances and partnering come from a reduced requirement for 
tendering’. While this admittedly ‘goes against the grain, especially for the public sector’, and causes 
concern with all clients that that they are getting value for money, it is considered vital, since ‘cut-
throat price competition and inadequate profitability benefit no-one’ (Construction Task Force, 1998). 
The influence of the Egan report has prompted a number of further initiatives in the UK industry, 
including the Movement for Innovation (M4i) and the Best Practice Programme of the Construction 
Innovation and Research Management Division of the Department of the Environment Transport and 
the Regions, both of which retain an interest in the reform of tendering practice. 
However perhaps the single most significant shift in procurement policy has come from the 
implementation, on 1 April 2000, of the Local Government Act 1999. Under the Act, the requirement 
for Compulsory Competitive Tendering had been abolished, and replaced with ‘Best Value 
Procurement’. Broadly speaking ‘Best Value’ requires a council to seek improved performance by 
whatever means is best. It is likely to transform the way services are procured and delivered. The 
legislation requires authorities to challenge whether existing practices are still relevant, consult on 
better cost-effectiveness, compare its performance with others through benchmarking, and compete 
with the best solutions (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1999: 47). The result is that local authority 
clients are enabled to experiment with alternatives to tendering. 
PROPOSED RESEARCH 
The research proposed in this paper is intended to examine the practicalities of new ways of working 
in terms of their actual costs.  The objectives are to discover from practitioners the structure and 
magnitude of the costs of tendering; to develop a mechanism for measuring the true costs of 
tendering; to develop a deep understanding of the costs of tendering; and to use this new data and 
understanding to identify and quantify the relationship between forms of procurement, types of 
project and the costs of tendering.  
Method 
The research will involve a two-stage approach.  First, the costs of transactions will be identified and 
classified.  Second, these costs will be quantified.  The method for collecting data on tendering costs 
will involve extensive collaboration with industrial partners.  Eleven major construction and 
consultancy firms have agreed to provide access to comprehensive data collection. 
The widely varying circumstances of contractors and projects make this topic very complex.  It will 
first be necessary to update and develop the existing literature review to identify the nature and 
variety of project supply characteristics, approaches to collaboration between participants and 
methods used in the selection of consultants, contractors and sub-contractors.  A three-dimensional 
framework of variables representing the varieties of market relationships encountered in the 
construction industry will be developed.  Purposeful sampling will be used to ensure participants 
represent cover all configurations (Patton 1990, Neuman 1994). 
Focus groups, guided by a theme list, will then be held with participants.  The focus group approach 
has been chosen because the aim is to expose rich and detailed information about where costs are 
incurred and how they are dealt with.  Focus groups are ideally suited to this purpose because the 
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members of the group develop the conversation with minimal prompting from researchers.  Focus 
groups will be organized by type of project participant, such as client/developers, design consultants, 
contractors, sub-contractors and other specialist consultants, ensuring a variety of project supply 
arrangement and type.  Mixed sessions will not be held because of the sensitivity of information under 
discussion. 
The focus group transcripts will be analysed, using ethnographic content analysis, to elicit meaning 
and structure in the concepts and concerns of the participants.  This is ideally suited to development 
of a satisfactory and useful classification of transaction costs because these costs have not hitherto 
been classified and, using this approach, concepts do not exist a priori but emerge out of the research 
context (Bryman and Burgess 1994).  This also ensures that the information generated is not merely a 
confirmation of the researchers’ preliminary suspicions.  
Thus, a detailed classification of tendering costs will be derived, based on information elicited during 
the focus groups. Although this work is still at the proposal stage and there will be no attempt to pre-
empt concepts emerging from the focus group data, some structure is already evident in the potential 
details of costs associated with tendering.  It is likely that these costs will fall into the following three 
categories: 
 Pre-tendering work (such as marketing and arranging framework agreements); 
 Tendering work (such as calculating prices, risk assessments, environmental assessments, 
health and safety plans and quality plans); and 
 Post-tendering work (such as performance monitoring, enforcement and disputes). 
Using the classification system, a measurement method will be developed to collect detailed cost data 
for a particular tender. This method will be largely reliant on time sheets, developed by the research 
team, and used by industry participants to record their own cost data.  The research team will be 
interviewing and working closely with industrial partners during the data collection, as well as 
monitoring the processes of in-house data collection. 
The structured approach to the collection of data will enable costs for different project supply 
configurations to be identified and quantified.  Where sufficiently complete information is available, 
comparisons will be made between these configurations and non-parametric tests will be used to 
ascertain the influence of different market relationship and supply scenarios on transaction costs. 
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